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ZOBREST v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL
DISTRICT: EQUAL PROTECTION,
NEUTRALITY, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment prohibits the federal government from making
any "law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof."' The Framers of the Constitution, through the First
Amendment, set forth the standard for interpreting this religion clause by
espousing the doctrine that an impenetrable wall separates religion and
government.' The Supreme Court initially purported to hold to this stan-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first two clauses of the First Amendment are the Es-
tablishment Clause ("respecting an establishment of religion") and the Free Exercise
Clause ("prohibiting the free exercise" of religion). Id. Both clauses were extended to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The Supreme Court stated that "[tihe fundamental con-
cept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id. (footnote omitted). The ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment rendered both the Congress and the state legislatures equally in-
capable of "respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." Id. The Court held that the First Amendment prohibited states from infringing
upon the basic freedoms-freedom to believe and to act-embodied in both clauses. Id.
2. CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73-74 (John F. Wilson ed., 1965)
[hereinafter CHURCH AND STATE]. The impenetrable wall standard has its origins in the
writings of Thomas Jefferson. Id. James Madison later adopted the impenetrable wall
standard in his fight to curb establishment measures in Virginia. Id. at 68-72; see also
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance in its entirety).
Since the initial debates over the Virginia Constitution, the United States tried to follow
a policy of strict neutrality and separation of religion and government. See CHURCH AND
STATE, supra, at 73-74 (reproducing Jefferson's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom
(1786)). Thomas Jefferson, and later James Madison, encouraged government to walk the
fine line of neutrality between establishing religion and interfering in its exercise by citi-
zens. Id. at 68-74. In contrast, the definition of neutrality, as used in this Note, is the
definition stated in Everson: "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. The Supreme Court recently af-
firmed this neutrality definition in Board of Education v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487
(1994). Madison's and Jefferson's policy of strict neutrality and separation, commonly re-
ferred to as the wall of separation or impenetrable wall standard, remained intact until the
middle of this century. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text (describing religious
separation in colonial America). But see Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (providing an example of
the modification of the impenetrable wall standard by finding no violation of the Establish-
ment Clause when monetary assistance for school transportation reached parents whose
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dard in interpreting the Establishment Clause.3 However, in the last sev-
eral decades the Court has moved further away from the impenetrable
wall standard.4 The Court appears to be searching for a way to maintain
government neutrality among religions while allowing more interaction
between religion and government.5 Government neutrality is focused on
the equal treatment of religious and nonreligious institutions in governed
society.6
In the recent past, the Supreme Court has formulated various tests in
an attempt to achieve this neutrality and to find a suitable replacement
for the impenetrable wall standard.7 In doing so, the Court recognizes
children attended religiously affiliated schools); see also infra notes 52-55 and accompany-
ing test (describing a history of religious accommodation by government).
3. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (stating that neither a
state nor the federal government "'can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another' "(quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 15)); Everson, 330 U.S.
at 15 (stating that "Inleither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church").
4. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that a statute
that aids religion is not a violation of the Establishment Clause if it has a secular purpose,
has as its primary effect one "that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and does not
"foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion'" (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see infra notes 98-144 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Lemon v. Kurtzman's effect on Establishment Clause analysis).
The Supreme Court's movement away from the bright line rule of the impenetrable wall
caused a great deal of confusion and inconsistency in the area of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. See infra notes 111-82 and accompanying text (discussing the several tests
the Court formulated to address the problems surrounding the Establishment Clause).
5. The Court has never stated explicitly that accommodation of religion should be
greater. But by tearing down the impenetrable wall of separation, this is the inevitable
result. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2471 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that while "the Court never has authorized a public
employee to participate directly in religious indoctrination," that is a necessary conse-
quence of any move away from an impenetrable wall standard); Everson, 330 U.S. at 18
(allowing state transportation aid to flow to nonpublic schools, thereby accommodating
religion while still holding to an impenetrable wall).
6. See supra notes 217-26 (defining the neutrality standard). This represents an even-
tual recognition of the importance of the interaction between religion and governed soci-
ety, as evidenced by the Court's opinions in the last 50 years. Compare Everson, 330 U.S.
at 15 (indicating that government cannot establish a religion or pass laws assisting religion
in any way) with Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467 (claiming that "[tihe service [upheld] in this
case is part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child
... without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school
the child attends") and School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963) (stating "that
religion has been closely identified with our history and government") and Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962) (stating that "[tihe history of man is inseparable from the history
of religion") and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (stating that "[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being").
7. See infra notes 98-182 and accompanying text (examining the various tests used in
Establishment Clause cases). Only the three-part test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman has
gained any acceptance. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 380 (1985)
(applying the "familiar" Lemon test to shared time and community education programs
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religion not as a separate entity existing apart from American society, but
as an entity that is a part of American society, functioning like other parts
of society and entitled to many of the same benefits.' A minority of the
Court, however, has consistently rejected the recognition of religion as a
part of society.9 This faction continues to guard against any further de-
struction of the impenetrable wall standard.10
offered to nonpublic school children); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (using the Lemon test to determine the constitutionality
of a statute establishing three financial aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secon-
dary schools). See generally infra notes 99-161 and accompanying text (examining the
Lemon test's acceptance by the Supreme Court and subsequent criticism). Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy introduced alternatives to this test. See, e.g., County of Allegheny
* v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgement in part and
dissenting in part) (outlining the no coercion test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth the no endorsement test). Many commen-
tators offered alternative tests as well. See, e.g., Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment
Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293, 303 (1993) (applying a
sociological approach to Establishment Clause adjudication); Gary J. Simson, The Estab-
lishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 905, 923-32 (1987) (suggesting ways to fine tune the tests that the Court uses); Steve
Gey, Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1477 (1981) (advocating a return to the
impenetrable wall standard); see infra notes 163-76 and accompanying text (examining Jus-
tice O'Connor's no endorsement test); infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text (examin-
ing Justice Kennedy's no coercion test).
8. See infra notes 209-16 (discussing the extensive role of religion in America and the
Court's recognition of that role). Religion is entitled to societal benefits and government
support on a functional basis when its actions are within the "civil religion." See Maddi-
gan, supra note 7, at 320-26 (defining "civil religion"). A civil religious function is one
that, although theologically intertwined with a religion, contributes to the moral character
of the country by supporting democracy and democratic values through public practices
common to all religions. Id. The Establishment Clause only prohibits government aid to
those functions that are traditionally religious in nature or go beyond the role religion
plays in the civil religion. Id. at 309.
9. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,404 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that tax benefits to parents of children attending nonpublic schools violated the Estab-
lishment Clause); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the Court's holding that textbooks supplied by the government to
religiously affiliated schools were not so ideological as to violate the Establishment
Clause); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315-18 (Black, J., dissenting) (questioning a statute allowing
children to leave school early to attend religious instruction); Everson, 330 U.S. at 28 (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting) (reasoning that government funding of transportation for religious
schools is inconsistent with the Framers' intent).
10. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 380-81. Even though only a minority of the Court since
Everson viewed religion and government as completely separate, this view still manages to
prevail in some cases. See id. at 381 (stating that the First Amendment "is more than a
pledge that no single religion will be designated as a state religion").
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Everson v. Board of Education1 represents the first Establishment
Clause case to strike a blow to the impenetrable wall. 2 Since Everson,
the Court has taken the position that the Establishment Clause is not an
absolute, as the impenetrable wall standard suggests. 3 The Court is mov-
ing in the direction of accommodating religion to the extent that it is a
part of society that can be supported by government, 4 while reconciling
this notion of accommodation with a restrictive constitutional clause that
historically provided for a separation of religion and government. 5 The
Supreme Court's search for a standard that accomplishes this reconcilia-
tion has lasted several decades and has succeeded only in fragmenting the
Court in Establishment Clause cases. 6 The standards suggested by sev-
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. Id. at 17. By upholding transportation reimbursements by government for paro-
chial school children, the Court allowed greater interaction between religion and govern-
ment, something the impenetrable wall was meant to prohibit. Id.; see infra notes 78-85
and accompanying text (arguing that while some commentators believe Everson main-
tained the impenetrable wall, it in fact created an exception to the impenetrable wall
standard).
13. See Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385 (stating that "Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence is characterized by few absolutes," but noting it absolutely prohibits government
sponsorship of a specific religion); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (stating
that "there is room for play in the joints [of the Establishment Clause] which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference").
14. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89
(1986) (accommodating religion by holding that a person may use aid from a state program
to further his religious studies); Maddigan, supra note 7, at 296 (stating that religion plays
an important role in American society and therefore some interaction between religion
and government is necessary).
15. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 93 (1986) (arguing that the
First Amendment "was framed to deny power, not to vest it," thus limiting any accommo-
dation of religion).
16. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 315 (1986).
As a result, the Court is extremely divided in some Establishment Clause cases. For exam-
ple, five justices filed separate opinions in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 375 (opinion of the Court); id. at 398 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 398 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 400
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 400 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Similarly, six opinions were filed in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 232 (1977) (opinion
of the Court); id. at 255 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 256 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgement in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 264 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This Note uses the terms "fragmented" and "divided," in relation to the Supreme Court,
not to refer to a Supreme Court divided sharply along traditional ideological or jurispru-
dential lines. Instead, these terms refer to a Supreme Court that disagrees as to what test
or what form of test should apply in a particular area of the law. In contrast, a "cohesive"
Court is one that basically agrees to what test should be used, but may disagree as to the
outcome after applying the test to a particular set of facts.
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eral justices 7 have proven to be unwieldy or doctrinally unsound.' 8
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,19 the Court implicitly
introduced yet another Establishment Clause standard that includes an
equal protection type analysis. 20 This approach acknowledged one stan-
dard endorsed by commentators in the Establishment Clause field.2 '
Zobrest involved James Zobrest's request to the Catalina Foothills
School District for a school district-paid sign language interpreter to ac-
company him to Salpointe Catholic High School.22 The school district
denied the request as a violation of the Establishment Clause.23 Zobrest
brought a suit based on the federal Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act (IDEA),24 its Arizona counterpart,25 and the Religion Clauses
17. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (explaining the Lemon test); infra
notes 162-76 and accompanying text (examining Justice O'Connor's no endorsement test);
infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy's no coercion test).
18. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Burger, J., dissenting) (voic-
ing concern over the Court's "obsession" with the Lemon criteria); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting new criteria that "clarifies"
the Lemon test); see also Maddigan, supra note 7, at 300-02 (arguing new approaches to
Establishment Clause cases); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illu-
sions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266,302-
13 (1987) (criticizing Justice O'Connor's no endorsement test); Gey, supra note 7, at 1473
(criticizing the no endorsement and no coercion tests).
19. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). The Court addressed two issues in Zobrest. One dealt with
the Establishment Clause and the other dealt with whether the Court should decide the
Establishment Clause issue at all. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2465-66, 2466-69. On the latter
issue, the dissenting justices argued that the case should be remanded to develop a record
on a possible statutory solution to avoid reaching the constitutional issue unnecessarily.
Id. at 2469-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The major-
ity rejected this self-restraint rule because the "posture" of the case made the self-restraint
rule inapplicable and, therefore, the constitutional issue could be reached. Id. at 2466; see
infra note 194 (examining in detail the application of the self-restraint rule).
20. See infra notes 238-46 and accompanying text (discussing Zobrest's application of
equal protection standards to Establishment Clause cases).
21. See David A. Steinberg, Alternatives to Entanglement, 80 Ky. L.J. 691, 731-35
(1992) (suggesting a "classification model" alternative to current Establishment Clause
tests); Paulsen, supra note 16, at 315 (endorsing an equal protection standard for Establish-
ment Clause cases); cf. Maddigan, supra note 7, at 296 (endorsing a test that will recognize
religion's role in American society). The Court does not explicitly reject the often used
Lemon test, but never applies it to the facts in Zobrest. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-69. The
Court only mentions the test when discussing the lower court's decision. Id. at 2464-65.
22. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
23. Id. Pursuant to the Arizona statute, the request was first sent to the County Attor-
ney, who made the initial determination as to the constitutionality of the request. Id.
Then the request was sent to the Arizona Attorney General, who agreed with the County
Attorney. Id.
24. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
25. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-761 to 15-772 (1991
& Supp. 1994).
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of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.26 The United
States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the school dis-
trict's decision.27
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit28
relied on the three-part test first enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman29 and
found that providing an interpreter would violate the Establishment
Clause.30 In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not ap-
ply the Lemon test. Instead, the Court focused on the neutral application
of the statute,31 finding that providing a school district-paid sign language
interpreter did not violate the Establishment Clause.32 The dissent, ad-
hering more closely to the impenetrable wall standard, found that provid-
ing James Zobrest with a district-paid sign language interpreter would
violate the Establishment Clause.33
This Note examines Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District as an
indication of the Supreme Court's move toward applying a neutrality
standard in Establishment Clause cases. This Note first examines briefly
the history of the establishment of religion in the United States. This
Note then examines the history and progression of modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and then outlines the constitutional tests the Court
developed in the last twenty years. This Note posits that the Zobrest de-
cision represents a movement toward the use of a neutrality standard by
attempting to reconcile the Establishment Clause with statutes that per-
mit any aid to religion on a neutral basis with other societal institutions.
This Note then argues that this neutrality standard allows religious and
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra note 1 (discussing the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses).
27. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. James Zobrest, seeking a preliminary injunction and
any other relief that the Court deemed proper, argued that the IDEA, its Arizona counter-
part, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required that the school district
provide an interpreter, and that such a requirement was not barred by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. Id. The district court denied the injunction on the
grounds that to grant it would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. The court granted
summary judgment to the school district. Id.
28. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
29. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
30. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193-96 (applying the Lemon test).
31. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467; see infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the majority opinion at length).
32. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
33. Id. at 2471-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent posited that any aid, no mat-
ter how indirect, violated the Establishment Clause, and argued that the Court had never
allowed a public employee to assist in the religious indoctrination of children. Id. The
dissent acknowledged the fact, however, that "'Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
characterized by few absolutes.' " Id. at 2473 (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
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nonreligious institutions to be treated alike by government when both
perform the same functions. This Note concludes that the use of a neu-
trality standard, as suggested in Zobrest, will lead to the application of a
lower, yet still rigid, standard of review to some Establishment Clause
cases, thus benefitting American society by allowing religion to perform
its civil religious functions in the same capacity as nonreligious
organizations.
I. RELIGION IN UNITED STATES HISTORY: TOWARD THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Much of the debate surrounding the Establishment Clause centers
around the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Some scholars as-
sert that the Framers intended the Clause to be applied strictly, preclud-
ing all government aid from reaching any religion and prohibiting
religious action from influencing government action.34 Others focus on
government action at the time the Clause was adopted to argue that the
clause allows for religious accommodation.3" In light of these varied
viewpoints, it is imperative to understand religion's role in the United
States when the First Amendment was written, as well as today.
A. Religion in Colonial America
1. Religious Separation in Colonial America
Religion played a major part in the settling, formation, and develop-
ment of the United States.36 As a result, the Founding Fathers recog-
nized the need to preserve religion and prevent government interference
34. See LEVY, supra note 15, at xii (stating that historical analysis indicates that "reli-
gion flourishes best when left to private voluntary support in a free society"); see also
David Felsen, Comment, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis:
Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 426 (1989) (stating that when strict
separationism is synthesized with the Lemon test, the strict effect of the Establishment
Clause is realized); Gey, supra note 7, at 1473 (arguing for a return to the impenetrable
wall standard).
35. Maddigan, supra note 7, at 296 (arguing that government interaction with religion
is consistent with the Framers' intent); see also Hal Culbertson, Note, Religion in the Polit-
ical Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 916 (arguing
that Lemon's purpose prong restricts the right of religious participation in the political
process).
36. WINTHROP S. HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 5-29 (2d ed. 1973). From John
Winthrop's "city set on the hill" sermon, to the Puritans on the deck of the Arabella, id., to
Pope John Paul II's visit to Denver in July of 1993, religion has helped shape the destiny of
this country like no other single force. Moreover, from the time of the Framers a belief in
God has profoundly impacted American thought. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 213 (1963) (stating that the Founding Father's firm belief in God was "clearly evi-
denced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself").
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of any kind.37 To guarantee religious liberty in a country containing so
many different religions, the Founding Fathers believed in the practice of
strict government neutrality,38 meaning that government should neither
favor nor disparage one religion over another. Thomas Jefferson first es-
poused this notion in his Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (Act).39
Jefferson condemned the establishment of religion 40 because he believed
it deprived citizens of their natural rights and tended to destroy and cor-
rupt religious principles.4 '
Jefferson regarded the passing of his Act as one of his greatest achieve-
ments, but the passing of the Act is attributed to James Madison.42
Madison also was responsible for the Establishment Clause in the Federal
Constitution.4 3 His "Memorial and Remonstrance," in which he argued
against a bill pending in the Virginia legislature that provided state reve-
nue to support seminaries, indicated his strong belief in religious free-
dom.44 His opposition, and that of Jefferson, to the establishment of
37. See supra 39-51 and accompanying text (discussing Jefferson's and Madison's ab-
horrence of established religion). Although the Founding Fathers valued the separation of
religion and government, many represented states that continued to endorse religion well
into the 19th century. HUDSON, supra note 36, at 104. Massachusetts was the last state to
repeal its establishment statutes, in 1833. William R. Marty, To Favor Neither Religion nor
Nonreligion: Schools in a Pluralist Society, in EQUAL SEPARATION 95, 111 (Paul J. Weber
ed., 1990).
38. See infra notes 39-51 (discussing the separatist intent of the Founding Fathers); cf
James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 42, 42-43 (1992) (ar-
guing that in order to protect itself from too powerful a faction, a government should
maintain neutrality toward and yet encourage factionalism so one faction does not become
too powerful).
39. THOMAS JEFFERSON, An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THOMAS JEF-
FERSON SELECTED WRITINGS 13, 13-15 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. ed., 1979). The Act for-
bade the establishment of religion in Virginia because religious freedom is a natural right
that cannot be taken away by the government. Id. at 15. Although first submitted to the
Virginia legislature in 1779, the bill was not passed until 1786 in the midst of the fervor
caused by James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947); Jefferson's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Jefferson's Act].
40. Jefferson's Act, supra note 39, at 73.
41. Id.
42. Id. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance changed religious freedom from a
statement of tolerance to "the first official legislative pronouncement that freedom of con-
science and religion are inherent rights of the individual." Everson, 330 U.S. at 34 (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
43. ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
93-94 (1964).
44. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY, supra note 39, at 68, 72. For Madison, "religious freedom was the crux of
the struggle for freedom in general." Everson, 330 U.S. at 34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
1216 [Vol. 43:1209
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religion in Virginia is frequently enunciated by justices on the Supreme
Court who adhere to the impenetrable wall standard.45
The writings of both Jefferson and Madison on the subject of religious
establishment indicate that they intended the separation between religion
and government to be absolute.46 Notwithstanding the vehemence with
which they spoke out against religious establishment, both stressed the
importance of complete separation for the sake of religion and govern-
ment.47 Principally, the separation of religion and government was meant
to guard against "three main evils": sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activities.48
These evils were undoubtedly on Madison's mind while drafting the
Bill of Rights, specifically the First Amendment. Even though many ar-
gued that the "no religious test" clause in Article V149 of the Constitution
sufficed to guard against any sort of religious oppression,5" the Establish-
ment Clause became the first clause of the Bill of Rights.5 '
45. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2662 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(citing Jefferson's "wall of separation" language); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 647 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reciting Madison's introduction of an anti-estab-
lishment amendment to the Federal Constitution in 1789); Everson, 330 U.S. at 34 (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting) (citing the entire Memorial and Remonstrance in appendix). Madison
opposed extensive interaction between government and religion because religion does not
need state support to survive, establishment is not necessary for the support of civil reli-
gion, and "equality... ought to be the basis of every law." Madison, supra note 44, at 69.
46. DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT 56 (1991); James M. Dunn, Neutrality and the
Establishment Clause, in EQUAL SEPARATION, supra note 37, at 57-58.
47. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-12 (discussing Jefferson's and Madison's fight against
religious establishment). Professor Leonard W. Levy argues that some commentators have
"developed a plausible but fundamentally defective interpretation of the establishment
clause to prove that its framers had no intention of prohibiting government aid to all de-
nominations or to religion on a nonpreferential basis." LEVY, supra note 15, at 91. This
presupposes, of course, that Jefferson and Madison were right in their fears of religious
establishment or that their fears still hold true today. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part) (stating
that "[alt this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers that
prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights").
48. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (stating that because the Consti-
tution does not explicitly state prohibitions with regard to the Establishment Clause, the
lines of reference must be the "three main evils" the Clause was meant to guard against);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (stating that the three main evils are what
the Framers meant by "'establishment' ").
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The Constitution provides that "no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office of public Trust under the United States."
Id.
50. LEVY, supra note 15, at 63-64. Madison himself believed, initially, that no amend-
ments to the original document were needed. See DAVIS, supra note 46, at 53-55; Dunn,
supra note 46, at 57.
51. See U.S. CONST. amend I. For a detailed account of the Establishment Clause
debates of 1791, see STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 43, at 93-100. Professor Leonard W.
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2. Religious Accommodation in Colonial America
Although the United States prides itself on the separation of religion
and government, American history shows that religion and government
have been, in fact, heavily intertwined. For example, government en-
dorsement of Thanksgiving and Christmas have continued since the time
of the First Congress.52 Chaplains were appointed for Congress and the
Armed Forces, and in 1789, Congress considered funding for an Ameri-
can bible.53 Even the public university founded by Thomas Jefferson did
not prohibit religious education.54 It is interesting, then, that both Jeffer-
son and Madison advocated absolute separation when religious involve-
ment in society and government was commonplace during their era.55
B. Religion in America Today
As it was at the time of Madison and Jefferson, religion is still very
much a part of American society today.56 Although it may appear that
America's religious convictions have waned somewhat in recent de-
cades,57 religious fervor is still alive and religion remains very much inter-
Levy argues that the text of the Constitution itself leads to the conclusion that Congress
does not have the power to aid all religions equally. LEVY, supra note 15, at 84. Levy
suggests that the First Amendment serves to restrict Congress' powers to those enumer-
ated in the main document. Id. Because Congress was never given the power to legislate
on any religious matter, it is unreasonable to argue "that an express prohibition of power
•.. vests or creates the power, previously nonexistent, of supporting religion by aid to all
religious groups." Id. Moreover, because the history of the drafting of the Establishment
Clause does not shed any light on the meaning of establishment of religion, only the text
should be examined. Id. However, the fact that establishment was commonplace among
the states and that the federal government traditionally endorsed religious holidays when
the First Amendment was ratified suggests that the Framers did not intend such a strict
separationist view. Instead, it could be argued that a neutral stance by the government was
required to maintain the religious freedom sought by the Framers. See WILBER G. KATZ,
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 13 (1963) (arguing that the language of Ever-
son requires the Court to uphold laws that apply to all citizens, even if benefiting religion).
52. DAVIS, supra note 46, at 141-42.
53. Laura Zwicker, Note, The Politics of Toleration: The Establishment Clause and the
Act of Toleration Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773, 791 (1991).
54. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
55. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text (discussing Jefferson's and
Madison's beliefs). Jefferson at least had doubts about some of these practices. STOKES &
PFEFFER, supra note 43, at 53. His strong belief in separation of religion and government
even led to some misgivings about a federal Thanksgiving Day. Id. Also, he objected to
proclamations on national days of prayer by several Presidents. Id. at 504.
56. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussing religion in American soci-
ety today).
57. See Maddigan, supra note 7, at 296 (stating that the enrollment of Americans in
mainline churches has declined).
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twined with our daily lives 8 and our government.59 For instance, from
the time of George Washington, inaugurations invoked God's name in
speech or in oath.' Prayer still opens most state and the federal govern-
ment legislative sessions each year.61 While Thanksgiving and Christmas
are national holidays, they are also heavily religious.62
The Supreme Court was hesitant to account for the important role that
religion plays in American society.63 Recently, however, the Court has
come to recognize that religion and government coexist and are of equal
importance in maintaining support for American democracy.' 4 It is from
this position that the Court is attempting to reconcile the dual notions of
religious accommodation and separation.
II. THE SEARCH FOR A STANDARD: BUILDING AND TEARING DowN
THE WALL
Although those justices who supported Jefferson's impenetrable wall
standard prevailed initially, the Court soon created many exceptions so
that the standard barely resembled the one Jefferson espoused.65 Ini-
58. Kenneth L. Woodward, Talking to God, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 39. A recent
survey found that 78% of all Americans pray at least once a week, while 57% pray at least
once a day. Id. Furthermore, 40% of Americans attend services once a week. Id. at 40.
59. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675-78 (1983) (reciting the history of govern-
ment approval and support of Thanksgiving and other religiously based holidays); Zwicker,
supra note 53, at 791 (noting the appointment of chaplains to the armed forces and to
Congress). Contra Culbertson, supra note 35, at 916 (arguing that court decisions have
restricted religious involvement in the political process).
60. Peggy Landers, U.S. Presidents Quick to Invoke God's Help, CALGARY HERALD,
Jan. 23, 1993, at C9 (noting that all 42 presidents called upon God during the oath of office
to help in their duties).
61. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer).
62. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675 (stating that Thanksgiving "has not lost its theme of
expressing thanks for Divine aid any more than has Christmas lost its religious signifi-
cance" (footnote omitted)).
63. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (finding unconstitu-
tional the use of public school buildings for the teaching of religion); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that the wall between religion and government is
"high and impregnable" and the Supreme Court "could not approve the slightest breach").
But see School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-14 (1963) (examining the relationship
between religion and American government and society).
64. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (stating that the Constitution does not require complete
separation between religion and government because "[n]o significant segment of our soci-
ety and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from
all the other parts, much less from government"); Maddigan, supra note 7, at 296 (stating
that for religion to fulfill its proper role within American society, there must necessarily be
interaction with government).
65. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (stating that the impenetrable wall
is " 'blurred, indistinct, and variable'" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971))).
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tially, the impenetrable wall separating religion and government main-
tained a sturdy form, with few and narrow exceptions.66 The bright line
rule existing since the drafting of the Constitution eventually disap-
peared, however, and the Court created a muddled area of law.
67
A. Everson and the Impenetrable Wall
Everson v. Board of Education68 was the first "modern" Establishment
Clause case. 69 In a close decision, the United States Supreme Court up-
held a New Jersey school board program that reimbursed the parents of
nonpublic school children for transportation costs. 70 The only nonpublic
school in the district, however, was a Catholic school.7 '
The Everson Court found that earlier First Amendment cases gave the
Religion Clauses a broad meaning.72 The Court, in essence, held that
providing transportation to students who attend religiously affiliated
schools is a general welfare program similar to police and fire protection,
sewage disposal, and the building and maintenance of public sidewalks.73
66. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 (holding that only aid from school districts to assist in the
transportation of nonpublic school children was not violative of the Establishment Clause).
67. See infra notes 68-182 and accompanying text (discussing the history of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence). Before Everson v. Board of Education, the Court had few
occasions to visit the Establishment Clause. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (citing pre-Ever-
son Establishment Clause cases). The number of Establishment Clause challenges began
to rise due to the increased role government began to play in American society during and
after the New Deal.
68. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
69. Karen F. Gray, Comment, An Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399, 410 (1990). It is generally accepted that
Everson is the first modern Establishment Clause case because it required "a challenged
statute to have a valid secular purpose." Id.; see R. Collin Mangrum, Shall We Pray?
Graduation Prayers and Establishment Paradigms, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1027, 1033
(1993) (concluding that "the rhetoric of strict separationism has pervaded modern Estab-
lishment Clause cases since Everson"); William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regu-
lating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 296
(1986) (stating that "the Court set the framework for its modern [E]stablishment [Clause]
understanding" in Everson).
70. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
71. Id. at 30-31 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 21.4, at 464 (2d ed. 1992).
72. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. The Court stated that "[t]he State contributes no money
to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than
provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion,
safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The
Everson approach indicated that, at this point in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Court still focused on traditional Establishment Clause neutrality between religions and
not between religion and non-religious organizations performing the same activity. See id.
at 15.
73. Id. at 17.
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The dissent vigorously opposed the program.74 Justice Rutledge, writing
for the dissent, claimed that the history of the Religion Clauses made it
impossible for the program to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny.75
Justice Rutledge rejected the notion that even if a statute applied neu-
trally to all religions it would pass Establishment Clause scrutiny; instead,
he argued that any government aid to religion was unconstitutional.76
Thus, the dissent argued that the statute should be struck down because
the Constitution required complete separation of religion and govern-
ment and not comprehensive identification of government with religion."
Some argue that the impenetrable wall standard is impossible to main-
tain because of the nature of religion in American society.78 Others, like
the dissenting justices in Everson,79 argue that the impenetrable wall is
required by the text of the Constitution and history and is necessary to
the well being of religion and government alike.80 Yet, several Supreme
74. See id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that "there are no good grounds upon
which to support the present legislation"); id. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (doubting that
Jefferson or Madison would have upheld the statute in question).
75. Justice Rutledge stated that:
[W]e have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete
separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for
religion.
... [Ilt is only by observing the prohibition rigidly that the state can maintain
its neutrality and avoid partisanship in the dissensions inevitable when sect op-
poses sect over demands for public moneys to further religious education, teach-
ing or training in any form or degree, directly or indirectly.
Id. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 59-60. Justice Rutledge explained that
[t]he problem then cannot be cast in terms of legal discrimination or its ab-
sence. This would be true, even though the state in giving aid should treat all
religious instruction alike. Thus, if the present statute and its application were
shown to apply equally to all religious schools of whatever faith, yet in the light of
our tradition it could not stand. For then the adherent of one creed still would
pay for the support of another, the childless taxpayer with others more fortunate.
Id. (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 60.
78. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("No significant segment of our
society and no institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation
from all the other parts, much less from government."); Maddigan, supra note 7, at 296
("The Religion Clauses embody the drafters' understanding that religion plays a particular
function in American society and that some government interaction with religion is neces-
sary to fulfill that function.").
79. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
80. Gey, supra note 7, at 1473-77. Steve Gey outlines five reasons why the separation
of religion and government should be absolute. Id. at 1473. First, religion is a personal
matter that should be free from government influence. Id. Second, government aid to one
religion would legitimize that religion, and, as a result, demean other faiths. Id. Third,
government aid to religious schools would induce schools to modify their programs. Id.
Fourth, government aid is not necessary for the well being of religious schools, as evi-
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Court cases considered Everson a definitive statement that courts should
apply the impenetrable wall standard to Establishment Clause cases. 81
Furthermore, many consider Everson to be a case that reenforces the im-
penetrable wall.82
Everson did, however, chip away at the impenetrable wall by allowing
government aid to flow indirectly to religion on a neutral basis.83 By up-
holding transportation reimbursements by government for parochial
school children, the Court allowed greater interaction between religion
and government, something the impenetrable wall prohibited.' Further-
more, the dissent vehemently opposed the majority by arguing that the
wall is absolute, even to the degree allowed by the Court in Everson.85
B. The Effect of Everson on the Establishment Clause
Everson's weakening of the impenetrable wall standard impacted
greatly upon later Establishment Clause cases. Despite this significant
impact on Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Everson provided little
guidance for courts construing the Establishment Clause.
In McCollum v. Board of Education,86 the Court found that an Illinois
school district program allowing children to attend religious education in
the school building during the school day violated the Establishment
denced by the throngs of religious schools that exist without it. Id. Finally, the Free Exer-
cise Clause does not require public funding for secular schools, as some cases have held,
because the clause does not mean that the "machinery" of the state can be used to practice
a belief. Id. at 1476 ("[The F]ree Exercise [Clause] 'has never meant that a majority could
use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs'" (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963))).
81. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (citing Everson as a source of the
separation of religion and government); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211
(1948) (stating that the Establishment Clause "was intended to erect a 'wall of separa-
tion'" between religion and government (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947))).
82. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312, McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211; see also Zwicker, supra
note 53, at 794 (criticizing the Court's conclusion in Everson that the Framers intended the
Establishment Clause to require a wall of separation between religion and government).
83. Everson, 330 U.S at 17. Justice Douglas, a member of the Everson majority, stated
a few years later that the case may have been decided wrongly and that the impenetrable
wall should have been maintained, suggesting that Everson did in fact strike a blow to the
impenetrable wall. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(stating that "[tihe Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First
Amendment").
84. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
85. Id. at 28-29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
86. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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Clause. 7 Four years later, however, in Zorach v. Clauson,8 the Court
upheld a New York City program similar to that of Illinois.8 9 These in-
consistent decisions characterized Establishment Clause cases in the de-
cades following Everson.90
The Court also struggled to maintain consistent treatment of govern-
mental imposition of religion on citizens. In McGowan v. Maryland,91
the Court upheld a Sunday closing law on the grounds that the law was
no longer exclusively religious in nature despite its religious history.92
Just two years later, however, in School District v. Schempp,9' the Court
held that the Establishment Clause prohibited the reading of the Bible
87. Id. at 212. The Champaign County Board of Education established a program that
allowed religious teachers to enter a public school and teach religion for 30 minutes a day.
Id. at 205. Although Illinois law required children between seven and 16 years of age to
attend school when school was in session, the school dismissed children from classes to
attend religious instruction. Id.
The Court struck down the program in an eight to one decision, holding that the pro-
gram was "beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public
school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith." Id. at 210. This type of pro-
gram fell "squarely under the ban of the First Amendment." Id.
The Everson dissenters concurred in McCollum, but wrote separately to emphasize their
commitment to the impenetrable wall standard. Id. at 212 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(stating that the Constitution forbids the commingling of sectarian and secular instruction
in the public schools). The dissenters stressed the history of the Religion Clauses, id. at
213-25, and reiterated their Everson stance that "[sleparation is a requirement to abstain
from fusing functions of Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all
equally." Id. at 227.
88. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
89. Id. at 314-15. Stating that the constitutional standard "is one of degree," the Court
distinguished the New York program from the program invalidated in McCollum because
the children went elsewhere for religious education. Id. at 314. Ultimately, the New York
statute did not violate the Religion Clauses because "[t]he First Amendment ... does not
say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State." Id. at
312.
90. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (upholding tax deductions for
parents of children who attend nonpublic schools) with Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 769 (1973) (striking down tax credits for parents of
children who attend nonpublic schools). See generally Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and
Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984)
(describing First Amendment religion law as "a mess" and "muddled and internally incon-
sistent"); Maddigan, supra note 7, at 294 (stating that Supreme Court cases in the Estab-
lishment Clause area "have yielded infamously inconsistent results" (footnote omitted));
Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Deci-
sion, 67 TEx. L. REv. 955, 956 (1989) (describing Establishment Clause doctrine as "seri-
ously, perhaps distinctively, defective" (footnote omitted)).
91. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
92. Id. at 435.
93. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools because of the
pervasive religious history of these acts.9 4
By espousing the impenetrable wall standard while at the same time
not adhering to it in Everson, the Supreme Court had to search for a new
standard that would recognize the necessary interaction between religion
and government, but still limit congressional and state power in respect-
ing the establishment of religion.95 The Court struggled to find a bright-
line rule after Everson eliminated the impenetrable wall standard, but no
bright-line rule was readily apparent.96 This struggle formed both the ba-
sis for the neutrality standard the Supreme Court is currently moving to-
wards97 and the basis for many years of division on the Court in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
III. THE SEARCH FOR AN ESTABLISHMENT STANDARD
A. Development and Criticism of the Lemon v. Kurtzman Test: The
Confusion Begins
Once the impenetrable wall fell, the Supreme Court began to search
for a test that would allow some accommodation of religion, while main-
taining at least the spirit of separation. Several tests were suggested, yet
most did little to reconcile separation and accommodation.
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman
The Supreme Court first attempted in Lemon v. Kurtzman98 to stand-
ardize several criteria99 that would allow moderate integration of religion
and government.' Lemon involved statutes from two states: Penn-
94. Id. at 223.
95. See infra notes 98-110, 162-81 and accompanying text (discussing various standards
the Supreme Court proposed in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
96. See Donald E. Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First Amend-
ment, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 681, 683 (1989) (stating that Everson "was a harbinger of future
calamity"); Paulsen, supra note 16, at 317-18 (finding that the Court "forced a square his-
torical peg into a round doctrinal hole" in Everson).
97. See infra notes 209-45 and accompanying text (describing the neutrality standard
the Court is moving toward, as evidenced by its decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993)).
98. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
99. Id. at 612-13. Although the Court used each of the three prongs of the Lemon test
previously, a cohesive test that incorporated them all was never formulated until Lemon.
See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (describing the Lemon test).
100. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. History and precedent aside, Lemon began the Supreme
Court's eventual recognition of the role that religion plays in American society and some
accommodation of religion's role in the civil religion is necessary. See id. (recognizing that
"total separation [between religion and government] is not possible in an absolute sense");
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (stating that "no institution within [society]
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sylvania and Rhode Island.1 1 The Pennsylvania statute allowed the State
to reimburse nonpublic school teachers' salaries, as well as the cost of
textbooks and teaching materials used in nonpublic schools.' 2 The
Rhode Island statute called for the State to provide a fifteen percent sup-
plement to nonpublic school teachers' salaries from state funds.' 3
Rhode Island supplemented teacher's salaries, while Pennsylvania reim-
bursed the students; yet both statutes amounted to giving aid directly to
nonpublic schools.'"
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, gleaned three criteria
from previous Establishment Clause rulings and formulated a three-part
test.0 5 The test required that to pass constitutional muster, a statute
must have a secular purpose, a primary effect that does not advance reli-
gion, and must not require or necessitate excessive entanglement be-
can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less
from government").
101. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606. Both statutes enabled their respective states to financially
aid church-related elementary and secondary schools. Id. at 606-07.
102. Id. The Pennsylvania statute provided reimbursements to both elementary and
secondary schools, while the Rhode Island statute only aided elementary schools. Id.
103. Id. at 607.
104. Id. at 607-09. The main beneficiaries of the reimbursements were Catholic
schools. Id. at 608, 610. A federal trial court found that 95% of Rhode Island children
who attended nonpublic schools attended schools affiliated with the Catholic Church. Id.
at 608. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, a trial court found that 96% of private school children
attended religiously affiliated schools, most of which were Catholic. Id. at 610.
Commentators question the relevance of these percentages in deciding Establishment
Clause cases, suggesting that various assumptions the Court could make based on these
percentages might be improper and not very useful. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 71,
at 467 n.18; see also Mark Fischer, The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the
"Wall of Separation" and its Impact on the Religious World View, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 325,
346 (1992) (stating that the affiliation of the Catholic Church with a large percentage of
private schools implies that any aid flowing to private schools helps to establish the Catho-
lic faith); Steinberg, supra note 21, at 731 n.289 (stating that because the Catholic Church
constitutes a large percentage of private schools, "[g]overnment aid to private schools
might appear as an endorsement of the Catholic Church" (emphasis added)).
105. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. Two prongs were developed in Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), where the Court upheld a New York law allowing the State to
lend textbooks to parochial schools. Id. at 248. In doing so, the Court found that a statute
does not violate the Establishment Clause when the law has a" 'secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.'" Id. at 243 (emphasis
added) (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
In Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Court upheld a property tax
exemption for religious organizations that used the property for religious purposes. Id. at
680. In doing so, the Court identified the third prong considered in Establishment Clause
cases. Id. at 670. For a statute to pass Establishment Clause scrutiny, it can not involve
excessive government entanglement with religion nor can it require "official and continu-
ing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement." Id. at 674-75.
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tween government and religion." 6 Chief Justice Burger cautioned,
however, that the impenetrable wall was a line of separation that changed
with the circumstances of each case' °7 and the Lemon test allowed for
this flexibility.' Thus, the Lemon test began as merely a loose standard,
subject to the interpretations of individual judges and individual
circumstances.
Ultimately, this flexibility was the Lemon test's undoing. Although ini-
tially embraced wholly by the Court, justices and commentators alike
eventually criticized the test.'0 9 The most recent Establishment Clause
cases that have upheld aid to religiously affiliated institutions only men-
tioned the Lemon test and applied one or none of the Lemon prongs to
decide the outcome of a case." 0
2. The Court's Use of the Lemon Test to Hold State Law
Unconstitutional
Although the Supreme Court and commentators later criticized the
Lemon test,"' the Court utilized the test many times as a means to find
state laws unconstitutional. The Court reiterated the Lemon test in Com-
mittee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist," 2 finding un-
constitutional a New York statute and program providing direct aid to
106. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. "First, [a] statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, Allen, 392 U.S. at 243; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674); see also
supra note 105. Justice Burger also warned against "[tlhe potential for political divisive-
ness" resulting from excessive government entanglement with the church. Id. at 623. This
fourth prong never took hold and existed primarily in Justice Brennan's opinions. See, e.g.,
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
107. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
108. Id. Chief Justice Burger later criticized the Court for its "obsession" with the
Lemon test's criteria. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing opinions critical of the Lemon test); see also infra
notes 145-61 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the Lemon test). Justice
Scalia colorfully yet sternly criticized the Court for citing to Lemon v. Kurtzman, stating
that the Lemon test is a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried." Id.
110. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1994) (finding invalid a state
statute creating a school district within a wholly religious community on the basis of an
unconstitutional delegation of state authority); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95
(1983) (failing to apply the Lemon test to determine if the opening of legislative sessions
with prayer violates the Establishment Clause).
111. See infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the
Lemon test).
112. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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nonpublic elementary and secondary schools' 13 and to parents of children
who attended those schools." 4 The Court, determining that the statute
advanced religion," 5 reinforced Everson and held that a nonreligious
state action applying to all citizens is a neutral approach to religion." 6
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball 17 and Aguilar v. Felton"' repre-
sent two additional cases in which the Court affirmed the use of the
Lemon test as the measure for Establishment Clause cases. 119 However,
the Court did not apply all three parts of the test.' 20 The Court invali-
dated the statute in Grand Rapids and stated that the ultimate question in
every Establishment Clause case was whether the aid provided to the reli-
gion was "direct and substantial."'' In Aguilar, the Court focused on the
fact that the statute allowed excessive entanglement between religion and
government 22 and increased political divisiveness. 123
113. Id. at 774. The Court again found it important that nearly all of the nonpublic
schools receiving the aid were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 768; see
supra note 104 (discussing the use of the percentage of religiously affiliated institutions
that receive government aid by the Court).
114. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. at 780. In holding the programs viola-
tive of the Establishment Clause, the Court focused on the primary effect prong of the
Lemon test, stating that "[i]n the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the
state aid derived from funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideologi-
cal purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is invalid." Id.
115. Id. at 794.
116. Id. at 782. State action is valid under the Establishment Clause where the action is
"provided in common to all citizens [and is] 'so separate and so indisputably marked off
from the religious function' that [it] may fairly be viewed as reflections of a neutral posture
toward religious institutions." Id. (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18
(1947) (emphasis added)) (citation omitted).
117. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). In Grand Rapids, the Court held invalid two school district
programs-one allowing for private school teachers to educate generally adults and chil-
dren in private elementary schools at school district expense and the other paying teachers
to teach nonreligious courses in private schools during the school day. Id. at 375.
118. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). The New York City program held invalid in Aguilar was
similar to the program in Grand Rapids in that the school paid teachers to teach nonreli-
gious courses in private schools throughout the school day. Id. at 406; see supra note 117
(discussing Grand Rapids School District v. Ball).
119. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412; Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 380.
120. Rather than applying the full test, the Court limited its focus to only the excessive
entanglement prong in Aguilar and the primary effect prong in Grand Rapids. Aguilar,
473 U.S. at 412; Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 383.
121. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 394. Although Justice Brennan seemed to adhere to the
impenetrable wall standard, he accepted the premise "'that not every law that confers an
indirect, remote, or incidental benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone,
constitutionally invalid.'" Id. at 393 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
122. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413.
123. Id. at 414.
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3. The Court's Use of the Lemon test to Uphold State Law
Dissatisfaction with the Lemon test and the fragmentation that it
caused on the Supreme Court was most evident in cases in which the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute. Accordingly, the
Court searched for a new test and laid the groundwork for the neutrality
standard.
The Court applied the Lemon test in Meek v. Pittenger,24 and upheld
one aspect of a Pennsylvania loan program that provided textbooks to
nonpublic schools.' 25 The Court also invalidated program provisions that
allowed for the loan of other types of instructional material 126 and pro-
vided remedial and therapeutic services to nonpublic schools. 27 The
Court found that the Establishment Clause allowed assistance to pro-
grams that financially benefitted nonpublic school students equally and
indirectly. 28 Furthermore, the Court determined that as long as the ben-
efit was secular, nonideological, and incidental to the school's religious
affiliation, the program did not offend the Constitution. 29
In Wolman v. Walter,' 30 the Supreme Court recognized the importance
of the neutral application of statutes and characterized this application as
a "common thread" in Establishment Clause cases.13 ' The Court ex-
plained that as long as the State provides " 'services, facilities, or materi-
124. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Justice Stewart wrote for a fragmented court that included
opinions from Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, all concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
Although the Court adhered closely to the Lemon test, Justice Stewart cautioned in
Meek, as did Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), and
later in Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 419, that the prongs of the Lemon test served "only as guide-
lines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause
have been impaired." Meek, 421 U.S. at 359. The fragmented opinions demonstrate that
each justice had a different view of how the guidelines were drawn and how they should be
applied.
125. Meek, 421 U.S. at 359 (finding that this program was "indistinguishable from the
New York textbook loan program upheld in" Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968)).
126. Id. at 366. The Court stated that even though the other materials were "wholly
neutral, secular instructional material and equipment," the program was nonetheless inva-
lid because it "inescapably results in the direct and substantial advancement of religious
activity." Id.
127. Id. at 374.
128. Id. at 364.
129. Id.
130. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
131. Id. at 242. In Wolman, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that loaned textbooks to
primarily nonpublic Catholic schools and provided funds for standardized testing, diagnos-
tic testing services, and instructional materials. Id. at 236-51. The Court held invalid a
provision to assist in field trip transportation. Id. at 252-55. The Court was once again
heavily fragmented in applying the Lemon test.
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als' "132 that are " 'secular, neutral, or nonideological,' "133 a statute
providing such aid does not have the primary effect of advancing religion
as prohibited by the Establishment Clause. 34
In Mueller v. Allen, 35 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that al-
lowed parents to take a tax deduction for expenses incurred for privately
educating their children.' 36 In approving the deduction, the Court fo-
cused on the neutral application of the statute, specifically the availability
to all parents, regardless of the type of private school their children at-
tended.' 37 This neutrality did not convey an endorsement of religion by
the State. 38 Although the Allen Court reiterated that the Lemon test is
the test for Establishment Clause cases, 139 the Court focused on the neu-
trality of the statute and not on the Lemon test.
Consequently, the Wolman decision marked the end of the impenetra-
ble wall. 4° The decision provided a balancing test to satisfy the primary
effect prong of the Lemon test.14 1 Wolman suggested that "direct" and
"substantial" aid to religious institutions must outweigh a "neutral" and
"secular" statute for the statute to be declared unconstitutional. 42 The
impenetrable wall standard, coupled with the Wolman balancing test, be-
came a much less stringent standard to apply. 43 However, the impene-
trable wall standard continued to ignore the fact that religion is an
integral part of American society, intertwined so heavily that to deny reli-
132. Id. at 242 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971)).
133. Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616). The statute in Wolman provided funding
and personnel for health services. Id. at 233.
134. Id.
135. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
136. Id. at 390. The program especially benefitted parents of children who attended
nonpublic schools, most of them religiously affiliated. Id. at 391. Ninety-five percent of
students who attended nonpublic schools in Minnesota attended schools that considered
themselves religiously affiliated. Id. The Court did not address this in its analysis, how-
ever, probably due to the pervasive neutrality of the statute's application.
137. Id. at 397.
138. Id. Justice Marshall, writing in dissent, criticized the majority's concept of neutral-
ity. Id. at 404 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the concept of neutral-
ity that the First Amendment requires prohibits "subsidizing religious education, whether
it does so directly or indirectly.... [T]his principle of neutrality forbids ... any tax bene-
fit." Id.
139. Id. at 394.
140. Whereas the balancing espoused in Wolman only allowed some state aid to reach
religious institutions directly, the impenetrable wall never allowed any aid, no matter how
direct or indirect, to reach religion. See supra note 131 (discussing Wolman).
141. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977).
142. Id.
143. See Gey, supra note 7, at 1466 (stating that cases decided after the fall of the
impenetrable wall are "evidence of the confused state of establishment clause law").
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gious institutions the aid available to nonreligious institutions that per-
form the same function is unreasonable and unequal.' 44
B. Attacking Lemon and the Resulting Tests
Although the Court purported to use the Lemon test in Grand Rapids,
Aguilar, and in most other Establishment Clause cases,' 45 the test was not
without its vocal critics.' 6 Two justices expressed their dissatisfaction
with the Lemon test in Aguilar.47 One, Chief Justice Burger, the author
of the Lemon test, criticized the Court for its "obsession" with the test.'
14
The other, Justice O'Connor, attacked the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test because it invited speculation as an interpretation of the Con-
stitution when only two parties were involved in a lawsuit. 49
This dissatisfaction with the Lemon test signaled the beginning of the
Court's search for either a new standard for Establishment Clause cases
or at least a refinement of the Lemon test. One thing was clear: the
Lemon test did not work to the Court's satisfaction and it had to be
changed.
1. The Court Seeks to Abandon the Lemon Test
Even when the Court was unanimous in deciding the outcome of Es-
tablishment Clause cases, it remained fragmented as to how to reach that
outcome. Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind150
144. Craig L. Olivo, Note, Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village
School Dist.-When Neutrality Masks Hostility-The Exclusion of Religious Communities
From an Entitlement to Public Schools, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 776-77 (1993).
145. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2148 (1993); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985).
146. See Paulsen, supra note 16, at 331 (recognizing that the shortcomings of Lemon
hide a viable analytic core that could be used to form a workable framework); Simson,
supra note 7, at 908 (suggesting substantial revision of the Lemon test).
147. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 423, 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court's
"'responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas by rote; [the Court's] duty is to determine
whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.'" Id.
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
149. Id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 105 (discussing the entangle-
ment prong of the Lemon test). Justice O'Connor also criticized any use of a "political
divisiveness test," arguing that "the 'elusive inquiry' into political divisiveness should be
confined to a narrow category of parochial aid cases." Id. (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983)). There is no indication what this category might be.
150. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). Although Witters used the full Lemon test, it commanded a
loose majority on the Court. The justices agreed that the Lemon test should be applied,
but disagreed about the method of application. See id. at 485-86 (applying the full Lemon
test); id. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring) (applying only one prong of the Lemon test and
balancing the direct and substantial with the neutral, indirect and incidental); id. at 493
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involved a state program that provided funding for handicapped students
to obtain special education."' The Court unanimously accepted that not
every statute that allows money to reach a religious organization does not
necessarily violate the Establishment Clause.'52 The Court noted that the
funds came from neutrally available state aid, and thus did not send any
message of state endorsement of a particular religion.' 53
Bowen v. Kendrick'54 continued the assault on the Lemon test,155 while
expanding the idea that a statute neutral on its face toward all secular and
sectarian organizations is not violative of the Establishment Clause. 56
Bowen recognized that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment do
not prohibit religious institutions from practicing or participating in social
welfare programs.' 57 The Court's recognition of this principle opened the
door for the support of religious institutions when performing a function
that is also performed by nonreligious institutions, so long as both reli-
gious and nonreligious activities are similarly supported. 5 s
Despite the Lemon test's apparent abandonment, 59 it was the Court's
first attempt to formulate a test that allows greater accommodation of
religion within the limits of the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, the
Lemon test caused massive fragmentation in many of the Court's opin-
ions and proved to be unworkable as a stable standard."6 This criticism
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor.,
J. concurring)) (developing the no endorsement test).
151. Id. at 483. Witters involved a student who used state funds to attend a religious
school in preparation for becoming a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Id.
152. Id. at 486.
153. Id. at 489. While the Witters Court did not establish neutrality as the basis for its
decision, the neutral applicability of the law was a factor in this decision. See id. at 488-89.
Furthermore, Justice Powell, concurring in Witters, argued that the statute passed consti-
tutional scrutiny because any benefit that the religious school received was due to the "pri-
vate choices of individual beneficiaries." Id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring).
154. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). Bowen validated a statute that provided funding for services
relating to adolescent sexual activity and pregnancy. Id. at 583. The statute required that
funding only be provided to organizations that did not advocate abortion. Id. at 596-97.
The effect was that organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church received direct aid
through this statute.
155. Id. at 609-18.
156. Id. at 609.
157. Id.
158. See Paulsen, supra note 16, at 358 (arguing that education is free and should be
equally available to all).
159. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text (discussing the apparent abandon-
ment of the Lemon test). Although apparently abandoned, Lemon remains the law. See
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) ("[W]e do not accept the invitation of peti-
tioners and amicus the United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.").
160. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2150
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (examining the inconsistent application of the Lemon test).
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indicated a need for a better test and led to the development of two alter-
native tests. Ultimately, these alternate tests were criticized as much as
the Lemon test.161
2. The No Endorsement Test
The harsh criticism endured by the Lemon test resulted in the develop-
ment of the no endorsement test.162  The test is a clarification of
Lemon.*63 The Lemon test prevents the government from acting with
the intent of approving or disapproving religion."6 Conversely, the no
endorsement test focuses on government practices that create a percep-
tion to an " 'objective observer' " of endorsing or rejecting religion. 65
Applying the no endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 66 Justice
O'Connor, concurring with the Court, argued that the Establishment
Clause permitted a city to display a Nativity scene.1 67 Justice O'Connor
found that because the city government displaying the scene did not in-
tend to endorse religion 68 or to communicate a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion, 69 the Nativity scene did not en-
dorse Christianity and, therefore, was not a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.170
161, See Maddigan, supra note 7, at 300-02 (criticizing the no endorsement and no co-
ercion tests); Gey, supra note 7, at 1473 (stating that no adequate replacement has been
found for the impenetrable wall standard).
162. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
Lynch decision, validating the use of a creche in a city's Christmas display, met with wide-
spread disapproval among commentators. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins
of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 155, 162
(1984) (comparing Lynch v. Donnelly to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); William
Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment
on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 787 (1984) (stating that Lynch v. Donnelly was
"not a credit to an able and distinguished [Supreme] Court").
163. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689. Justice O'Connor felt that the need to clarify the Lemon
test arose because "[i]t has never been entirely clear ... how the three parts of the test
relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause." Id. at 688-89.
164. Smith, supra note 18, at 270.
165. Id. at 272. The "fourth prong" of the Lemon test-potential political divisive-
ness-that the Court, and primarily Justice Brennan, kept alive was summarily dismissed
by Justice O'Connor. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She stated that
although there have been cases that treated political divisiveness as a separate prong or as
part of the entanglement prong, ultimately, "[g]uessing the potential for political divisive-
ness inherent in a government practice is simply too speculative an enterprise, in part be-
cause the existence of the litigation ... itself may affect the political response to the
government practice." Id.
166. 465 U.S. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 694.
168. Id. at 690-91.
169. Id. at 691-94.
170. Id. at 694.
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In Board of Education v. Mergens,'71 the Court applied the no en-
dorsement test to validate a statute requiring equal access to public
school buildings for any purpose, including religious purposes.172 Thus,
even using the no endorsement test, the Court considered the neutrality
of the statute and examined whether the statute applied equally to both
173religious and nonreligious activities.
Justice O'Connor's view that the no endorsement test is a clarification
of the Lemon test' 74 is shared to some extent by other members of the
Court.' 75 Commentators criticize the test, however, because it focuses on
the objective observer and thus lends itself to significant ambiguity. 176 As
a result, a third test was introduced to define more precisely the accepta-
ble level of religious accommodation.
3. The No Coercion Test
The third test, the "no coercion test," first set forth by Justice Kennedy,
concurring with the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACL U,1 77 allows
government practices that do not coerce a person into following or prac-
ticing a particular religion.'78 Of the Court's current tests, the no coer-
cion test is the most receptive to religion's role in society 179 because it
allows government action that does not advance religion. 180 Neverthe-
less, this test is confronted with many problems.
171. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
172. Id. at 249 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In Mergens,
Justice O'Connor stated that "[b]ecause the Act on its face grants equal access to both
secular and religious speech ... it [is] clear that the Act's purpose was not to 'endorse or
disapprove of religion.' " Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)) (emphasis
added).
173. Id.
174. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987) (citing Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (citing Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Grand Rapids
Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (stating that the Establishment Clause is vio-
lated when government action conveys a message of endorsement of religion); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 56 n.42 (citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
176. See Maddigan, supra note 7, at 231-35. Michael Maddigan questions the use of the
objective observer in determining what is government endorsement of religion. Id. at 301.
He also criticizes the fact that the term "endorsement" lacks definition. Id.; see also Smith,
supra note 18, at 283 (criticizing the ambiguous meaning of "endorsement").
177. 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgement in part and
dissenting in part).
178. Id. at 662.
179. Maddigan, supra note 7, at 335.
180. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664-65.
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The no coercion test may invalidate support of activities of religious
organizations that are not religious in nature at all, but are part of the
"civil religion" that should be exempt from Establishment Clause scru-
tiny.' 8' Furthermore, the no coercion test allows the government to en-
gage in wholly religious activities, such as the displaying of a creche at
Christmas.' 2 The broad sweep of this test makes it hard to gain majority
support, especially as the Court moves toward a neutrality standard.
Each of these tests contains deficiencies, leaving the Court heavily frag-
mented in its approach to Establishment Clause cases. As a result, the
Court continued its search for a standard to add both cohesiveness and
stability to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, while struggling to recon-
cile the dual notions of accommodation and separation.
IV. ZOBREST V. CA TALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT. THE MOVE
TOWARD NEUTRALITY
When Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District183 reached the
Supreme Court, Establishment Clause jurisprudence was characterized
by a fragmented Court and inconsistent opinions due to the inability of
the Court to reconcile accomodationist and separationist views of govern-
ment and religion. 4 Although the Court did not reconcile fully these
two views, it did move in that direction.
On appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the petitioner, James Zobrest, sued the Catalina Foothills School
181. Maddigan, supra note 7, at 335-36; see also supra note 8 (discussing the meaning of
civil religion).
182. Maddigan, supra note 7, at 336; see County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (applying
the no coercion test and finding constitutional a county's creche display).
183. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
184. See supra note 90 (characterizing the inconsistency and fragmentation of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence).
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District under IDEA18 5 and its Arizona counterpart.' 86 Zobrest based
his claim on the school district's refusal to provide him with a sign lan-
guage interpreter, as required by the IDEA, after transferring from a
public school to Salpointe Catholic High School.'87 In addition, Zobrest
argued that by refusing to provide the interpreter, the school district vio-
lated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,"8 and that the
Establishment Clause did not bar providing an interpreter. 89 Neverthe-
less, the school district refused to provide an interpreter, asserting that
because Zobrest attended a Catholic school, providing him with such aid
would impermissibly endorse religion.' 9°
Both the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the school district not to provide an interpreter. 19' The Ninth
185. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1988) (amended 1990).
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was enacted in 1970 to
assure that all handicapped children have available to them.., a free appropriate
public education which emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped
children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and locali-
ties to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and
assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.
Id. § 1400(c).
This statement of congressional purpose is a source of the solution to James Zobrest's
claim. For instance, the purpose of the IDEA is to ensure "free appropriate public educa-
tion." Id. (emphasis added). It says nothing about ensuring nonpublic education, much
less parochial education.
However, this statement of purpose also provides the basis for the Court's ultimate ap-
proach in this case. The IDEA calls for assistance to "States and localities to provide for
the education of all handicapped children." Id. (emphasis added). According to the
Court, because the IDEA applies to all handicapped children, aid is distributed on an
equal basis, "without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of
the school the child attends." Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467. The neutrality of the statute,
regardless of the fact that the IDEA explicitly limits itself to public education, would save
the statute. See infra note 194 (discussing the Court's refusal to examine the statutory
issue).
186. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464; see ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-761 to 15-772 (1991
& Supp. 1994).
187. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
188. The Ninth Circuit rejected Zobrest's Free Exercise claim. Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
Zobrest did not challenge that decision before the Supreme Court. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at
2465 n.5.
189. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
190. Id. The school district followed Arizona statutory procedures in reaching its deci-
sion to refuse to provide an interpreter for Zobrest. Id.; see supra note 23 (detailing Ari-
zona's statutory procedures).
191. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. For a detailed account of the lower court decisions, see
supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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Circuit based its affirmance on the longstanding Lemon test.192 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court did not use the Lemon test and reversed. 93
Addressing only the Establishment Clause issue,194 the Court focused on
192. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1193.
193. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2465.
194. Id. Although the Court addressed a constitutional issue, Zobrest clearly could
have been decided on a nonconstitutional basis. See id. at 2469 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the important constitutional question was reached unnecessarily). Justice
O'Connor did not address the merits, stating only that the " 'fundamental rule' [of avoid-
ing constitutional questions] suffices to dispose of the case before [the Court], whatever the
proper answer to the decidedly hypothetical issue addressed by the Court." Zobrest, 113 S.
Ct. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 283, 341-56
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing this fundamental rule).
The issue as to whether or not the Court will address a constitutional issue involves the
rule of self-restraint. An appeal from a lower court brings the entire case to the Supreme
Court. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985); McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421
U.S. 21, 31 (1975). This includes nonconstitutional questions decided below as well as those
that were not pressed in or passed on by the lower court. Locke, 471 U.S. at 92; United
States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27-28 (1980). It is only in exceptional circumstances that ques-
tions not pressed or passed on in a lower court will be reviewed. Youakim v. Miller, 425
U.S 231, 234 (1976). The Court, however, as a matter of judicial restraint, "will not reach
constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them." Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984); see Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48.
Thus, when a case arrives before the Court, it "will not pass on the constitutionality of [a
statute] if a construction of the [statute] is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional
ground fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be avoided." Locke, 471
U.S. at 92; see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 741-44 (1984); see also City of Mesquite
v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982) (stating that "[n]o reason for hasty deci-
sion of the constitutional question presented by this case has been advanced").
Locke requires the Court to find a nonconstitutional answer to an issue whenever possi-
ble. Locke, 471 U.S. at 92. The Court must reconcile Locke's statement that the Court
will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act if some other nonconstitutional ground is
available, id., with the rule that it will not address issues not pressed or passed upon below.
See Youakim, 425 U.S. at 234 (stating that " '[i]t is only in exceptional cases coming here
from the federal courts that questions not pressed or passed on below are reviewed' "
(quoting Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927) (emphasis added)). One solu-
tion is to remand a case for further consideration, as was suggested by the dissenting jus-
tices in Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). This is not uncommon. See, e.g., Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48,
51 (1984) (vacating judgment and remanding for consideration of the statutory question);
Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. at 295 (remanding to the lower court for a decision on state law);
Youakim, 425 U.S. at 234 (remanding to the lower court for consideration of conflict be-
tween state and federal law); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104
(1944) (stating that "[e]very one of these questions must be answered before we reach the
constitutional issues which divided the court below").
The rule of self-restraint, however, requires only that the Court avoid constitutional
questions whenever "fairly possible." Locke, 471 U.S. at 92; see Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147, 157 (1983). Apparently, the majority in Zobrest found that it
was not fairly possible to avoid the constitutional question, stating that a statutory question
"buried in the record" is not enough to invoke the rule. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466. How-
ever, there is no indication that the statutory question was buried in the record. As the
majority itself indicates, the case was brought under the federal IDEA and its Arizona
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several different factors rather than on the Lemon test, a test used by the
Court in two decades of Establishment Clause cases.
195
The first and most important factor was that any aid required by the
IDEA flowed to handicapped children on a neutral basis. 196 The second
factor was that any aid provided by the IDEA ultimately reached the
religiously affiliated school as a result of the private choices of individual
parents and not by the existence of some financial incentive within the
statute.197 Furthermore, any aid to the school was on an indirect basis' 98
and did not relieve the school of any cost necessary to carry on their
educational function. 99 The "primary beneficiaries" of the IDEA, ac-
cording to the majority, are handicapped students, not the sectarian
schools they attend.2" Lastly, the Court stated that, contrary to the
statement of the Ninth Circuit, the Establishment Clause does not abso-
lutely bar placing public employees in sectarian schools.2 ' Any fear that
a state-paid sign language interpreter would either add to or subtract
from what was taught at the sectarian school is tempered by the fact that
sign language interpreters must abide by ethical guidelines requiring
them to interpret everything exactly as said and intended.2 "2
counterpart. Id. at 2464; see supra notes 24-25, 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing
the IDEA and the Arizona statute).
195. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464-65. The Court mentioned the Lemon test only in its
recital of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. Id.
196. Id. at 2467; cf Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 878 (1990) (finding that a neutrally applicable drug law does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause).
197. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983)).
198. Id. Although the Court emphasized, as it had in the past, the indirect nature of the
aid, it is not clear whether this fact was crucial in disposing of Zobrest or future cases.
Rather, the question remains whether direct aid that flows to parochial schools from a
neutral statute and is a result of the independent choice of parents violates the Establish-
ment Clause. Zobrest and other Court decisions suggest that as long as a statute allows
government aid to flow to all schools or other "'publicly sponsored social welfare pro-
grams' "equally, the constitutionality of the statute would not turn on how the government
aid gets to a religious school or program. Id. at 2466 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 609 (1988)); see Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609. However, money flowing directly to a semi-
nary or a religion's collection basket may be excessive government aid to religion and,
therefore, violative of the Establishment Clause.
199. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
200. Id. at 2469.
201. Id.
202. Id.
1994) 1237
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:1209
The dissent vehemently opposed the majority's reasoning.2 °3 However,
the dissent, like the majority, did not strictly apply the Lemon test.2 °4
Instead, the dissent only alluded to the entanglement prong and argued
that a public employee is not allowed to participate directly in religious
instruction.2 5 Because religion was integrated so heavily in all aspects of
the school's curriculum, a state-paid sign language interpreter could not
avoid conveying religious messages. 2°6 The interpreter's job, therefore, is
infused with religious significance because of this environment.20 7 Ac-
cording to the dissent, promoting religious doctrines and advancing a
school's religious mission in this way is strictly prohibited by the Estab-
lishment Clause.20 8
V. NEUTRALITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION IN ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has evolved from completely sepa-
rating religion and government to a substantial integration of the two.
The Zobrest Court's move toward the use of a neutrality standard indi-
cates an attempt to reconcile the supposed separatist notion of the Fram-
ers20 9 with the accomodationist reality that religion plays a substantial
role in American society.210 This reconciliation could not be accom-
203. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter, reached the merits of the case, only
because the majority's arguments on the merits "deserve[d] a response." Id. at 2471
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, refused to address
the merits and held firm to the position that a remand for a trial on the statutory issues was
necessary. Id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 194 (discussing the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to remand the case for consideration on nonconstitutional
grounds and its ability to choose to do so).
204. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Lemon v. Kurtz-
man only once and never mentioning the three-part test).
205. Id. at 2471.
206. Id. at 2472.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2473 The dissenting justices conceded, however, that " 'Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes.' " Id. (quoting Grand Rapids Sch.
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)). It is interesting to note that the dissent seemed to
argue for the more restrictive position but is many times more liberal in its interpretation
of the Establishment Clause than the dissent in Everson, which sought to maintain the
impenetrable wall standard. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 43 (1947) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting) (stating that past Court decisions confirmed "the [First] Amendment's
broad prohibition" against the Establishment of religion).
209. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text (describing the possible intentions of
the Framers).
210. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (describing religion in America
today).
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plished under the Court's separatist view of the Religion Clauses. 211 The
Framers were concerned with all government involvement with religion,
especially in the form of financial support.2 12 Even though there was a
great deal of religious accommodation when the Religion Clauses were
enacted,213 the Court used the Framers' concern to support its impenetra-
ble wall standard.214 If the impenetrable wall standard were invoked to-
day, application of the IDEA215 would not survive Establishment Clause
scrutiny despite its neutrality because the IDEA aids religion through
government actions.21 6
For this reason the Supreme Court is moving toward recognizing a new
standard-a neutrality standard. This standard allows governments to
enact laws that apply equally to all religious and nonreligious organiza-
tions, thus furthering goals common to all organizations and persons. The
neutrality standard is consistent with the intent of the Framers and stays
true to the principle that government should remain neutral in its deal-
ings with religion.
A. The Neutrality Standard Defined
Religious accommodation and the supposed separationist intent of the
Framers can be reconciled by applying a neutrality standard, which
utilizes an equal protection type analysis. It is this kind of standard that is
suggested by Zobrest.217
At the time of Jefferson and Madison, religion and government were
substantially entangled;218 but the Framers desired to keep the two sepa-
211. As evidenced by the Everson dissent, the Court initially took the position that the
Framers' intended an absolute impenetrable wall. Everson, 330 U.S. at 43. However, the
Lynch and Marsh opinions show that this position has changed. See Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (upholding the public display by a city of a creche at Christmas on
the basis of history); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (upholding prayer at
legislative sessions on the basis of history and tradition).
212. See Madison, supra note 44, at 72 (speaking out against a bill providing tax dollars
to religious teachers in Virginia); supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
Framer's intent).
213. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text (discussing the pervasive interaction
between religion and government).
214. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (stating that "'[in the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect a wall of separation between church and State'" (quoting Everson, 330 U.S at 16)).
215. See supra notes 24, 185 and accompanying text (discussing the IDEA).
216. See supra notes 24, 185 and accompanying text.
217. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) (recogniz-
ing that the Establishment Clause does not bar religious organizations from receiving gen-
eral government benefits).
218. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (examining the concept of religion
entangled with government).
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rate.219 The neutrality standard reconciles these seemingly contradictory
notions. Where a statute applies to all citizens regardless of the religious
or nonreligious nature of the activity, 22° it falls like a blanket over all of
society, including society's publicly sponsored social welfare programs.22'
If a religious organization performs a function common to a nonreligious
organization, it should be treated equally regardless of its religious affilia-
tion.222 If a nonreligiously affiliated organization also performs such ac-
tivities, the function is likely a publicly sponsored social welfare program
or a civil religious function. This indicates that religiously affiliated orga-
nizations can receive the benefit of government aid.223
However, any statute regulating activities that nonreligiously affiliated
organizations cannot perform indicates that the statute is not neutral and
is subject to a higher level of scrutiny by the Court.224 In this context, the
Supreme Court applies an equal protection analysis to the question of
whether a statute is neutral on its face and is equally applied to all per-
219. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text (examining religious separation in
colonial America).
220. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
221. Id. at 2466.
222. See supra note 8 (discussing accommodation of religion performing civil religious
functions). In applying the neutrality standard, the Court would have to classify functions
performed by religious organizations as either unique to the organization or part of the
organization's civil religious function. Professor Philip Kurland argues that religious classi-
fications can be a legitimate basis for government action, whether to benefit or burden
religion. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CH. L.
REV. 1, 96 (1961). See generally David K. DeWolf, State Action Under the Religion
Clauses: Neutral in Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 253 (1990) (argu-
ing in favor of Professor Kurland's position).
223. See supra note 198 (discussing aid flowing to publicly sponsored welfare
programs).
224. The neutrality of a statute on its face is not dispositive of the issue of whether it
violates the Establishment Clause. The level of neutrality of the statute merely indicates
the level of scrutiny that will be applied by the Court. See infra notes 227-37 and accompa-
nying text (examining levels of scrutiny in Equal Protection jurisprudence). Only after the
level of scrutiny is determined can other factors, such as whether the aid is direct or indi-
rect and whether the aid is a result of independent choice, be weighed in deciding the
outcome. For instance, because the education of children is done by both religious and
nonreligious organizations, government aid in this area would be allowed.
One factor that may impact heavily on the constitutionality of a statute is the percentage
of religious institutions benefiting from government action in relation to all institutions.
See supra note 104 (discussing the Supreme Court's use of the percentage of private
schools receiving government aid that are religiously affiliated). Where the constitutional-
ity of statutes is decided on neutrality grounds, some measure of that neutrality must be
made; a statute that disproportionately favors religiously affiliated institutions (or a single
religion) may not pass the neutrality test. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982)
(applying an equal protection standard to an Establishment Clause case).
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sons.22 5 The Court is thus shifting Establishment Clause jurisprudence
toward an equal protection type of analysis.226
B. Equal Protection and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
1. Equal Protection Jurisprudence
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution227 requires government to either enact laws
that apply to persons equally or, if this cannot be accomplished, give a
rational reason for the inequitable application of the law.2 28 To deter-
mine whether government abides by this limit on its power, the Supreme
Court classifies the actions taken by government and applies a different
standard of review to each. A classification made by the government
passes equal protection review if it is justified by a legitimate governmen-
229tal purpose.
There are three standards of review, or levels of scrutiny, that the
Court uses in Equal Protection Clause cases. The first is the "rational
relationship" level of scrutiny.23 ° Under this standard, a law will with-
stand Equal Protection Clause scrutiny if the law bears a rational rela-
tionship to a legislative purpose not otherwise prohibited by the
225. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 (applying an equal protection standard to an Establish-
ment Clause case). The Equal Protection Clause states, in relevant part, that "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
226. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247. In Larson, the Court applied an equal protection type
analysis to a Religion Clause case, stating that the "rule must be invalidated unless it is
justified by a compelling governmental interest and unless it is closely fitted to further that
interest." Id. (citations omitted); see also Grumet v. Board of Educ., 618 N.E.2d 94, 102
(N.Y. 1993) (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (applying an equal protection standard to invalidate a
New York law creating a public school system to accommodate children of a particular
religious sect), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
227. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Equal Protection Clause is explicitly
applicable only to state and local governments, its purpose is applicable to the federal
government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the concepts of the Equal Protection Clause and the
Due Process Clause, while not interchangeable, both protect the American ideal of
fairness).
228. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949) (stating that "[tihe essence of [equal protection] can be stated
with deceptive simplicity" as "those who are similarly situated be similarly treated").
229. Id. at 349 (stating that the Supreme Court must determine the legislative purpose
of a law to examine whether the classification made by the law supports that purpose).
230. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (stating that the rational relation-
ship standard of review is applied where a classification involves neither fundamental
rights nor proceeds along " 'suspect lines"' (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
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Constitution. 231 The second standard of review is the intermediate level
of scrutiny.23 2 Under this level of scrutiny, a law will fail unless the classi-
fication bears a substantial relationship to an important government
interest.233
The third standard of review, and most important for Establishment
Clause purposes, is the "strict scrutiny" level.2 34 This level of scrutiny
requires the government to show that the classification it has created
closely serves some compelling or overriding purpose.235 While this level
of scrutiny is usually applied to classifications based on race,236 all "dis-
crete and insular minorities" receive this scrutiny.237
2. Equal Protection and the Establishment Clause
Courts should apply the strict scrutiny standard of review to laws that
classify on the basis of religion.23' The Establishment Clause explicitly
prohibits government from making laws that favor one religion over an-
other religion or nonreligion. A law favoring religion violates an explicit
fundamental right and is presumptively unconstitutional, subject to the
231. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (stating that for a "classifica-
tion scheme" to be upheld, it must be "'rationally related to a legitimate state interest'"
(quoting Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303).
232. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The intermediate level of scrutiny is
applied primarily to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy classifications. See
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 460-62 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to illegitimacy
classifications); Boren, 429 U.S. at 197 (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender
classifications).
233. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982) (stating that, in relation to an alien-
age classification, a state must show that the classification furthers a "substantial interest of
the State" (footnote omitted)).
234. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (stating that the
strict scrutiny test requires that the classification chosen by a legislature to accomplish a
compelling goal so tightly fits that goal that there is no possibility of an illegitimate motive
for the classification).
235. Id.
236. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (applying strict scrutiny to a
racial classification to find racial segregation in public schools violative of Equal Protection
Clause guarantees).
237. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). The "preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry." Id.
238. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (stating that the Supreme Court
must "apply strict scrutiny in adjudging" laws that grant a "denominational preference").
Professor Wilber G. Katz argues that the Court's language in Everson requires government
neutrality "not only between sects but also between believers and nonbelievers." KATZ,
supra note 51, at 13. This indicates that strict scrutiny should be applied to all religious
classifications.
1242
1994] Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 1243
most exacting scrutiny. 239 To survive this scrutiny, a presumptively un-
constitutional law must be justified by a compelling state interest and
must fit closely to further that interest. 24° Therefore, only a law that ap-
plies to religious and nonreligious organizations equally will pass the
equal protection analysis of the neutrality standard.24'
This equal protection analysis of Establishment Clause issues fits well
with Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 242 Both approaches limit gov-
ernment action, and both invoke members of society that should be
treated equally-individuals and organizations. Equal protection analy-
sis of Establishment Clause cases would be applied on a rational basis to
laws that affect civil religious functions of all organizations, or those activ-
ities common to both the secular and the sectarian.243 This approach
would recognize and even constitutionality allow the accommodation of
239. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (stating that classifications that im-
pinge on a fundamental right must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmen-
tal interest").
240. Larson, 456 U.S. at 247.
241. Similarly, the Declaration of Rights in the Virginia Constitution of 1776 spoke in
terms of equality when it stated that " 'all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.'" GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 35 (1987) (quoting 2 BEN P. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1857 at 1909 (comp. 2d ed. 1924).
242. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 (applying Equal Protection Clause standards to an
Establishment Clause case); Grumet v. Board of Educ., 618 N.E.2d 94, 102 (N.Y. 1993)
(Kaye, C.J., concurring), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (same). In Grumet, Chief Judge
Kaye stated that
The law at issue is precisely the sort of legislation that should be strictly scruti-
nized, because it provides a particular religious sect with an extraordinary benefit:
its own public school system. Although I am willing to assume that the law is
addressed to a compelling governmental interest-providing special education and
related services to disabled children who would otherwise go without such assist-
ance-the law is not closely fitted to that purpose, as more moderate measures
were available to satisfy that purpose.
Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text (examining Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence).
243. For instance, in the aid to private schools cases, the Court was very concerned with
the fact that most of the parents that benefitted from the programs sent their children to
parochial schools. See supra notes 111-44 (examining cases involving aid to private
schools). The vast majority of those schools were religiously affiliated. Under a neutrality
standard, the equal protection analysis would apply to determine whether the aid was justi-
fied by the government interest in having all children in the state receive an education and
whether the aid program was closely fitted to further that interest. Because the aid was
given to all children who attend private schools, there is no religious classification and
rational basis analysis should apply.
After determining the standard of review, various factors, such as the direct or indirect
nature of the accommodation, whether the accommodation is a result of independent
choice, and whether religion overwhelmingly benefits may be taken into consideration.
For instance, a statute that benefits Catholic schools over schools run by other religions,
while not explicitly intending to create a religious classification, may be unconstitutional.
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religion. On the other hand, the Court would apply strict scrutiny to any
law, regardless of its classification, that benefitted or burdened activities
unique to a particular religion or outside the scope of civil religious activi-
ties performed by a particular religion.244 At this point, the Court must
once again erect the impenetrable wall.245 This application of an equal
protection standard thus serves to allow accommodation of religion while
protecting against an unconstitutional establishment of religion.246
C. Problems Confronting the Neutrality Standard
The neutrality standard may be unable to overcome certain obstacles
to give the Establishment Clause the clarity it needs. First, a conflict may
be created with religious free exercise because the neutrality standard is
based in part on the invalidation of religious classifications.247 However,
the neutrality standard actually promotes free exercise by protecting reli-
gion from governmental intrusion on uniquely religious practices while
allowing religion to perform its civil religious functions more fully.
Second, there is the question of whether borrowing a standard that pri-
marily focuses on government equality will work in a standard that partly
focuses on separation of religion and government. 248 For no matter how
broadly the Establishment clause is viewed, if the clause is taken together
with the Free Exercise Clause, it requires that some barrier exist between
religion and government. While this separation is certainly not abso-
But cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that a law is not "unconsti-
tutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact").
244. See Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 102 (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (urging application of strict
scrutiny where a "particular religious sect" is given "an extraordinary benefit").
245. For instance, a statute that provides direct financial aid for the manufacturing of
wine to be used in religious ceremonies, without any intervening independent choice,
would be unconstitutional unless a strongly compelling state interest could be shown.
246. See supra notes 217-26 and accompanying text (discussing the balance that should
be struck between religious accommodation and establishment).
247. Steinberg, supra note 21, at 733. For instance, the Supreme Court has allowed
Amish school children to be exempt from compulsory school attendance. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972). Prohibition of religious classifications would be inconsis-
tent with this type of religious exemption. Steinberg, supra note 21, at 733.
248. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose behind separa-
tion of religion and government); supra notes 227-28 and accompanying test (discussing the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause).
249. Although the Court has stated many times that a barrier exists between religion
and government, it is a very low barrier in terms of a religion's civil religious function. See
supra note 8 (discussing the scrutiny that should be applied to state actions that. aid the
civil religious functions of religion).
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lute,25° no such concept of complete separation exists in Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence.
Finally, there is no indication that the Court will realize the neutrality
standard fully before abandoning it for another test. Because of past fail-
ures of tests in this area, the searching that the Court has gone through in
the last few years, and the inevitable changes of personnel, it is uncertain
whether the full potential of this standard will ever be realized. 1
VI. CONCLUSION
Religion will continue to play a vital role in all aspects of American
society. Establishment Clause jurisprudence historically refused to recog-
nize this role and required that religion and government remain separate
entities, even on the smallest scale. Eventually, many exceptions were
developed that weakened this strict separation, creating a confusing and
fragmented area of the law.
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District indicates the Supreme
Court's continued recognition that complete separation of religion and
government is not required by the Establishment Clause by suggesting a
neutrality standard. This concept treats religious organizations as any or-
ganization that serves a function in society. Furthermore, the neutrality
standard that the Court is moving toward promises to end the years of
confusion and fragmentation characteristic of Establishment Clause anal-
ysis. With the help of government aid available to all organizations that
perform the same function, the neutrality standard promises to allow reli-
gion to continue to function effectively in and to support society.
James J. Dietrich
250. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2473 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (stating that" 'Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by
few absolutes'" (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)); Grand
Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385 (same).
251. However, five justices joined the Zobrest majority opinion, indicating that there is
some support for the neutrality standard. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2463. On the other hand,
Justices White and Blackmun, each on opposite sides of the opinion, retired from the
Supreme Court. It is impossible to predict how their successors, Justices Ruth Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer, will vote in this area. As circuit court judges, each followed Supreme
Court precedent. Their own jurisprudence in this area, therefore, can not be any more
clear than that of the Court.
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